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NOTES.
THE SHIPPER'S INTENTION AS TItE FACTOR DETERMINING
WIHEN COMMERCE IS INTERSTVrE.-The principle is Well settled that

a local carrier is participating in interstate Commerce if it is carrying
goods which are billed to or from another state; and the carrier,
therefore, is liable to Federal regulation to the extent to which it is
carrying such goods.'
This conclusion is not difficult to arrive at
since the goods, being billed directly to or from another state, are
The Daniel Ball, 1o Wail. 557. i9 I- ed. 999 (U. S. r87o); Barrett,
President of Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. z4, 53 L. ed. 483,
34 Sup. Ct. 2o3 (19r4) ; North Carolina R. R. Co. v.Zachary, 232 U. S. 248,
58 L. ed. 591, 34 Sup. Ct. 305 (1914).
(132)
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obviously in interstate commerce. However, a problem which is by
no means so easily disposed of, arises where goods are tiansported
from state to state but are not billed directly to the point of destination. Instead, they are billed to an intermediate point in either the
state of origin or the state of destination and there delivered to the
consignee and by him rebilled. Is the continuity of the transportation in that case so interfered with as to render that part of the carriage which is wholly within the state intrastate commerce?
A case involving that problem appeared recently in The Baltintorc and Ohio Soulhecstern Railroad v. Settlc and Clephanc,- where
lumber was shipped from the South to Oakley, Ohio, and there received by the consignees, who paid the freight and who, without
unloading the cars, reshipped the lumber within a few days on local
bills of lading to Madisomille, Ohio. They paid the local rate, which
was less than the rate under the interstate schedule that would have
applied if the lumber had been shipped directly to Madisonville. The
Supreme Court decided that the original, continuing intention of the
shipper, that the lumber was ultimately to go to Madisonville, determined, as a matter of law, that the movement was interstate throughout.3 The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which the
Supreme Court reversed, was that, since there was a delivery in
good faith to the consignees at Oakley. and an actual reconsignment
by him, the original and continuing intention to rebill the lumber to
Madisonville had no effect.' The Supreme Court used the oftrepeated expression that "the essential character of the movement" ,
must guide the court and not the mere method of billing. That,
however, is rather stating the problem than offering any solution.
In determining "the essential character of the movement," the
majority of the Supreme Court cases have declared that the method
of billing is not decisive. The rule has been that if goods are intended to be sent farther than a point to which they have been billed 4
243 Sup. Ct. 28 (1922).
'As to the importance of intention the court said: "For neither through
billing, uninterrupted movement, continuous possession by the carrier, nor unbroken bulk is an essential of a through interstate shipment. These are common incidents of a through shipment, . . . But where it is admitted that
the shipment made to the ultimate destination had at all times been intended,
these incidents are without legal significance as bearing on the character of
the traffic." p. 3o.
'272 Fed. 674, 677 (C. C. A. 1921).
'Chicago Junction Railway Co. v. United States, 2--6 U. S. 286, 3o4, 57 L
ed. 226, 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 83, 88 (19)
; Penna. R. Co. v. Clark Coal Co., 238
U. S. 456. 468, 59 L ed. 14o6, T-111, 35 Sup. Ct. 8, 899 (1914) ; McFadden ef
al. v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., z41 Fed. 562, 154 C. C. A. 338 (1917).
'It seems that there need not be a definite specific intention in each case.
Thus where the shipper sent lumber to a consignee at a port from which
lumber was constantly exported and the consignee w%-as
known by the shipper
as an exporter of lumber, it was held that the shipment to the exporter in the

134

UNIVERSITY OF pEVNNSYLVA.'IA LAIV REVIEW

and they are so sent,' the whole movement from its very inception
to the point where the parties originally intended the movement to
end, is interstate."
Thus, in Southern Terminal Co. v,. Interstate Commerce Com'mission' cotton seed cake was shipped from points in Texas billed
to Galveston, Texas, 'and delivered to the consignee there, who
ground the cotton seed into meal and sacked it before loading it on
board ship (for exportation). The court held the whole movement
to be one in interstate commeice since exportation was contemplated
from the beginning."' In1 Louisiana Railroad Commission v.Texas
and Pacific Railway Co.," staves were shipped from different points
in Louisiana to New Orleans on local bills of lading and after
being delivered there were exported. The court said that the intention was to export the staves and so the whole movement was interstate."' Neither in these cases nor in the many similar to them"
did it appear that the consignor knew at the time of shipment to
exactly what foreign port the goods were to be sent. That they were
destined for export was sufficient to make the whole movement
interstate. These cases differ from the principal case also in that
the breaks in transit were for bona fide purposes and not merely to
take advantage of a lower rate.
same state was interstate commerce when the lumber was subsequently exported. Texas and New Orleans R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. ulr,
57 L. ed. 442, 33 Sup. Ct. 229 (1913). Swift and Co. v. United States, 196
U. S. 375, 49 L ed. 518, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (i9o5) holds similarly in the case
of cattle shipped to stockyards.
'It is necessary that the goods must not only have been intended to go
beyond the intermediate pohit but the intention must be carried out. So the
court intimates in the Settle case, supra in Note 2, at p. 28. "That there
must be continuity of movement we may concede, and to a foreign destination intended at the time of shipment." Texas and New Orleans R. Co. v.
Sabine Tram Co., supra in Note 6.
'Ohio R. Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. ior, 56 L,id. 1004, 32
Sup. Ct. 653 0912); Penna. R. Co.v. Clark Coal Co., supra in Note 5; West37 Sup. Ct.
era Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346, 1t L, ed. ii8r,
623 (1917).
&2Y9 U. S.498, 55 . ed. 310, 3r Sup. Ct. -279 (1911).
" "It.niakes no difference, therefore, that the shipment of the products
was not made on through bills of lading. . . . They were all destined for
export and by their delivery to the Galveston, Harrisburg aid San Antonio
Railway they must be considered as having then been delivered to.a carrier
for transportation to their foreign destination." p. 527.
"229 U. S. 336, 57 L ed. 1215, 33 Sup. Ct. 837 (1913).
'"The staves and logs were intended by the shippers to be exported to
foreign countries and there was no interruption of their transportatiori to their
destination except what was necessary for transshipment at New Orleans."
P. 341.

. Swift and Co. v. United States, supra in Note 6; McFadden et of. v.
Alabama Great Southern R. Co:, supra in Note 5; Douglas Co. v. Southern
Railway, 2x6 Ill, App. 148 (1919).

NOTES

In spite of the emphasis which in many cases the courts place
upon the shipper's intention, there are instances' where from the
peculiarity of the facts a different treatment of the situation is required. As the court said in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona," "the
statement of the case decides it." There a circus was held not to be
in interstate commerce although it was intended that it was to travel
out of the state after the scheduled performances. The court there
said the shipper's intention was not determinative."5
Another case very similar to some in which the court has
declared that the intention of the shipper rendered the commerce
interstate is Arkadlphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis South Western
Railroad Co. et al.,16 in which lumber was shipped to a mill within
the state to be dried and made into staves. .Although when the shipment was made it was known by the shipper that 95 per
cent. of the lumber found a market outside of the state, it was held
that the first shipment was intrastate.?
The court in the Settle Case explains the circus case by saying
that in such cases the applicable tariffs afforded no reconsignment
or transfer privileges.1 s It is difficult to understand why the amount
of the tariff or the absence of privileges allowed under the tariff
should make any difference, in view of the court's declaration that
the intention is decisive.
Coe v. Errol" seems to present a qualification of the intention
test as announced in other decisions. It was there held that logs
which had been sent down to a stream, upon which they were to be
floated to another state, could be taxed by the State if they were
held up before starting on the final interstate journey. The court
declared that carting or floating to a depot was no part of the interstate journey 20 but that once having been launched on their way to
another state, goods were in interstate commerce up to the final
U. S. 472, 63 L ed. 713, 39 Sup. Ct. 313 (1919).
"The mere intention of the shipper to ultimately continue his tour beyond the state of Arizona did not convert the contemplated intrastate movement into one that was interstate." p. 477.
1'249 U. S. r34, 63 E ed. 557, 39 Sup. Ct. 237 (1919).
"249

" "And the fact tfiat previous experience indicated that 95% of it must
be marketed outside of the State, so that this entered into the purpose of the
parties when shipping rough material to the mill did not alter the character
of the latter movement" p. 151.
36p.

31.

"zz6 U. S.

517, 229L ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. 415 (1896).
' It was held that carting or carrying goods from a depot after an interstate journey was part of the interstate movement. Barrett, President of

Adams Express Co., v. The City of New York, sup ra in Note 1. Jewel Tea
Co. v. Lee's Summit, Mo. et at., 217 Fed. 965, 133 C. C. A. 637 (1914).
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point of destination."1 As being the first "leg" of the journey, there
are cases which have held the carriage from the point of origin to
the place where the goods begin their final trip to another state to be
an interstate movement. 1
There are a fewv other Supreme Court cases whose language
cannot be reconciled with the Settle Case. In those cases the court
said that the shipper's intention was immaterial and specially emphasized the terms of the contract and the fact that delivery and control were taken by the consignee at the intermediate point. 21 Moreover, it appears that in passenger cases the court does not determine the nature of the commerce according to the passenger's intention. In New York Central Railroad Co. t. Mohnwy,24 a passenger,
who was using a pass good between two cities in Ohio, was injured.
He had intended, after his arrival at the Ohio city to which he was
going, to board immediately another train for Pittsburgh. The
court held that he was not in interstate commerce, declaring that
"the mental purpose of one of the parties to a written contract cannot change its terms." 25 Thus only two years before the Settle Case
the court followed the opposite line of reasoning. It is submitted
that there exists no valid ground for distinguishing passenger and
f reight cases.
From a practical point of view the decision in the principal case
is unsatisfactory. The court sets up an intangible element, the shipper's intention, as the determining fact in arriving at the nature of
the commerce. What goes on in a person's mind is always difficult
of proof, and railroad officials have no means of compelling a shipper
to divulge his intentions. "In many cases it would work the grossest
'The State can tax goods "until they are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the State to the State of their destination, or
have started on their ultimate passage to that State." The power of the state to
tax, however, does not necessarily indicate that the goods are not in interstate
commerce. There nay be taxation by the State of interstate commerce, it
seems, if it does not amount to a regulation of it. Swift and Co. v. United
States, supra in Note 6.
'Phila. & Reading Railway Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284, 64 L ed. 9o7
40 Sup. Ct. 512 (i9-o) held the movement of coal from mine to weighing
station interstate. See, also, Southern Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, supra in Note 9, and Louisiana R. Commission'v. Texas and
Pacific Railway Co., supra in Note ii.
"Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 51 L. ed.
540, -7 Sup. Ct. 360 (1907) ; Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Iowa,
233 U. S. 334, 58 L cd. 988, 34 Sup. Ct. 592 (1914). In the latter case the
court disregarded the fact that the shipper's purpose was to take advantage
of the lower intrastate rate.
"252 U. S. 152, 64 L ed. 502, 40 Sup. Ct. 287 (i92o).
= "To what extent the analogy between shipments of property and the
transportation of passengers may -profitably be pressed, we need not inquire,
for in this case the only contract between carrier defendant and the plaintiff was the annual pass issued to the latter." p. x56.
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injustice to a carrier if it could not rely on the contract of shipment
it has made, know whether it was bound to obey the state or
Federal law, or, obeying the former, find itself mulcted in penalties
for n6t obeying the law of the other jurisdiction, simply because the
shipper intended a transportation beyond that specified in the contract." 20 Whatever the court may mean by seeking for "the essential character of the movement," it ought to bear in mind that since,
"commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but
2
a practical one, drawn from a course of business," 7 it requires
practical rules to regulate it. When the mind of the shipper must
be investigated in order to determine what he intended previous to
the particular shipment, or what he intends to do after the shipment, it seems that a- legal conception of commerce is usurping the
place of. the practical one.
Furthermore, the rule is not only difficult for the carriers to
follow but offers difficulties even in its application by the courts.
There are many cases like the circus case in which the commerce
from the very facts appears to be intrastate, yet if the -intention of
the shipper is to be guiding it must be called interstate. The court is,
therefore, compelled bluntly to disregard the intention and be guided
by the contract.28 The determination of the nature of the commerce according to the terms of the contract between shipper and
railroad, merely taking into consideration the point of shipment and
the point where the particular shipment is delivered; could be easily
made by both courts and parties. There would be no necessity, as
exists at present, of drawing nice distinctions as to the character
of the manufacturing processesa or periods of time intervening
oetween the shipments. As a result the nature of the commerce in
many cases would no longer be an intricate problem for only courts
to solve and so much of tlze present and future litigation on the
question would become unnecessary.
S.A.G.
"Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, supra in Note 23.
'Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 37.3, 3, 49 L. ed. 518, 525,
25 Sup. Ct. 276, 28o (i9o5).
'Supra in Note x5.

"In the Arkadelphia case, supra in Note 16, the court declared the first
shipment to be intrastate because a manufacturing process intervened between
the two shipments.

In the Southern Terminal case, supra in Note 9, the

grinding and sacking of cotton seed cake was not sufficient to render the.first

shipment intrastate.
'In Ohio R. Commission v. Worthington, supra in Note 8, the storing

of coal after the first shipment for a considerable period was not sufficient to

makc the first part of the carriage intrastate. In the Arkadelphia cpse, supra
hi 'Note x6, a period of five months was considered too long, and so the first
shipment was intrastate. Also see Swift & Co. v. United States, .upra in Note
6, where the detention of cattle at stockyards till they were sold did not
make, the shipment to the stockyards intrastate if the cattle were subsequently sent out of the State.
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THE PRIVILEGE OF LAB1OR UNIOz OFFICIALS TO INDUCE A
BREACH OF CONTRACT.-It is now a well recognized principle of
law that one who maliciously induces a person to break his contract

with another is liable for the damages resulting from such breach 1

After the announcement of this rule in 1853, in the leading case of
Lumley v. Gyc, 2 there was a tendency to limit its appliction to con-

tracts of employment.3

Tortious interference, however, with con-

4
tracts other than for personal services, came to be held actionable,
and now it may be considered the established rule or most jurisdictions that any contract right will be protected against malicious inter-

ference by a third party.5

But can a labor union official be held liable for inducing a
breach of contract when his purpose is to benefit the union workers
whom he represents? This is the problem raised in the recent case of
R & W. Hat Shop, Inc. v. Scullcy.6 In i919 a sudden boom in
the hat business created the condition whereby the makers of "hats
in the rough" were unable to fill the orders pouring in from the
hat "finishing" shops. Union men in the "finishing" shops were
about to be thrown out of employment because there were not enough

"rough made" hats to work on. In answer to complaints, officers of
the United Hatters of America ordered officials of the local unions
to "visit and inform 'making' shops that in their judgment union

'finishing' shops should be given preference over non-union 'fin.
ishing' shops and that no shipment of these should be made to the
latter until the needs of the union 'finishing' shops had been satisfied." 1 One McLachlan operated a union "making" shop and had
a contract with the plaintiff to furnish him with "hats in the rough,"

which the plaintiff would finish in his non-union shop. Sculley, the
defendant, president of the local union, in accordance ivith his
orders, visited and advised McLachlan, whereupon the latter broke
'Dale v. Hall, 64 Ark. 22, 41 S. NV. 76z (z897); Gore v. Condon, 87
Md. 368, s9 At. io42 (zi&S); Cooley, Torts (3rd ed. i9o6), Vol. 2, p. 592.
'2 E. & B. 2t6, 22 L, J. (Q. B.) 463 (Eng. 1853).
This doctrine as set
forth in Lumley v. Gye was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in i88i in
Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 33, 50 L. J. Q. B. iz9 (Eng. x88i).
Boyson v. Thorn,
98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (189); Allen v. Flood
z.
[1898] App. Cas.
'Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (187); Morgan v. Andrews, io7
Mich. 33, 6. N. W. 869 (i89.3). Quinn v. Leathcm [isgo] App. Cas. 495;
Rice, etc., Iron Co. v. Willard, 136 N. E. 629 (Mass. 1922).
s"That the wrongful and malicious interference by a stranger with contract relations existing between others, by causing one to commit a breach
thereof, amounts to an actionable tort, is affirmed by nearly all the courts of
the present clay": Brown, J.,in Joyce v. Great Northern Railway Co., oo
Minn.225, 1iO N. W. 975 (ixo7).
aiS AtL. 55 (Conn. 1922).
'From the facts as stated by the court in the case cited .upra in Note 6.
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his contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was damaged, and sued
the union official but failed to recover in the lower court. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the decision and held Sculley
liable. There was a dissenting opinion rendered by Beach, J.
Two things, in the usual case, must be determined in order to
hold the defendant liable; first, that he knowingly and intentionally
induced the breach of contract, and, second, that he did it maliciously.
Sculley knew of the contract and, knowing of it, induced McLachlan
to break it. But the troublesome question is whether this was done
maliciously. Clearly he was actuated by no vengeful purpose, or
personal ill-will, but it is not malice in this sense which is requisite.'
The courts have held that in order to show that a defendant has
induced a breach of contract maliciously it need only be shown that
he did so wilhout just cause, and that what will constitute just0
cause must be left to the determination of the court in each case.
That'the defendant acts for his own benefit is not a justifiable
cause. 1 His justification for interfering with another's contract
must rise from some equal or superior right which he possesses.22
In determining whether he possesses such a right the conflicting in"'A study of the case of Lumley v. Gyc has satisfied me that in that case
the majority of the court regarded the circumstance that what the defendant
procured was a breach of contract as the essence of the cause of action. It is
true that the word 'maliciously' was to be found in the declaration, the validity of which was then under consideration, but I do not think the learned
judges regarded the allegation as involving the necessity of proving an evil
motive on the part of the defendant, but merely as implying that the defendant
had wilfully and knowingly procured a breach of contract": Lord Herschell
in Allen v. Flood, supra in Note 3, at p. ji3r; Bigelow, Torts, 256 (8th ed.
1907).

'In Mogul Steamship Co. v. 'McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 59o (892), in defining the word "maliciously" the court said: "In a legal sense it means a
wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse." Cooley in his
treatise on the Law of Torts uses the word in a lke manner; speaking of
"One who maliciously or without justifiable cause induces a person to break
his contract . . ." Cooley, Torts (3d cd. i9c6), Vol. A,p. 59a.
" Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales .Miners' Federation (1903), 2 K.
B. 545; Cooley, Torts ( 3 d ed. x9o6), Vol. 2, p. 593.
"Wcst Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., So NV. Va. 611, 40
S. E. 591 (19ot).
"It is not a justification that they acted bona fide in the best interest of
the society of masons, . e.,in their own interests. Nor is it enough that they
were not actuated by improper motives. I think their sufficient justification
for interference with plaintiff's right must be an equal or superior right in
themselves, and that no one can legally excuse himself to a man of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the ground that he acted on a wrong
understanding of his own rights, or without malice, or bona fide, or in the
best interest of himself or that he acted as an altruist, seeking only the good
of another and careless of his own advantage": Darling, J., in Read v.
Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons (1902), 2 K. 1. 88, 71 L. J. K. B.
[N. S.1, 99.
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terests of the various classes of society must be weighed in the scales
of social welfare.
Did the defendant in the Scullcy Case possess an equal or superior right by reason of his acting on behalf of the union workers?
The majority of the court, by their decision, held that he did not.
The dissenting judge, however, stated that he did have such privilege
on this reasoning: that it was actually a threat of strike which
caused the breach of the plaintiff's contract; that the union "makers"
in AMcLachlan's shop had a right to strike and so could threaten to
1 3
do so through their representative, the defendant
This assumes that, for the purpose of preventing their employer from furnishing hats to the plaintiff and other non-union
shops, the workers had a right to go out on strike without making
themselves liable to the plaintiff. 4 The so-called "right to strike,"
however, carries with it no paramount privilege which allows striking workers to escape civil accountability '5 to which, as individuals,
they ordinarily would be subject. If by their acts they make themselves guilty of a tort or breach of contract, they must be held liable
and no privilege attaching to the right to strike can be introduced, as
a magic wand, to spirit away such liability.16
It is submitted, therefore, that if the workers had carried out
their threat and had gone out on strike for the conscious purpose of
inducing a breach of the plaintiff's contract, they would have been
legally liable. As has been indicated, no immunity arising from the
right to strike could have protected them from that liability. So it
seems logical and proper that the court in the instant case should
'This

reasoning is supported by an able discussion of the case by Arthur

L. Corbin in "The Privilege of a Labor Union to Induce a Breach of Contract,"
in 32 YALE L J. 171 (Dec. 1922).
'The dissenting opinion in the Sculley Case says that "a stranger to a
contract may not for his own benefit and without legal justification knowingly induce a breach of it, but he is not bound to assist in its performance."
This seems purely contradictory and amounts to saying "he may not, but he
may," when applied to the right of one of McLachlan's workmen, for the
worker's refusal to assist in the performance of the contract merely represents his most powerful weapon in inducing its breach. It is a means whereby
he may intentionally ;nterfere with the contract, and if such be his purpose
in employing it he should be held liable.
"A privilege incident to the right to strike does protect strikers from
criminal liability. At common law they could be indicted for conspiracy, but
this has been changed by statute. Justice Brandeis, in the dissenting opinion
to Truax v. Corrigan. 42 Sup. Ct. 124. 133 el seq. (1921), outlines the history
of this statutory immunity from criminal punishment.
"See Moorefield Storey. "The Right to Strike," 3z YALE L J. 99 (Dec.
1922).

NOTES

have held their representative liable for threatening 17 such action,
since the intention Is was in fact to produce a breach of the plaintiff's contract.
S. .1. H.
.MISSTATEMENTS WIICI

AVOID INSURANCE Pomcrns.--Vhat is

the effect of a misstatement by the insured in an application for
an insurance policy? Before undertaking to answer this question,
it is well to consider, briefly, certain general principles which apply
as well to insurance contracts as to contracts generally. In the absence of words having peculiar significance with respect to the subject matter, insurance contracts are governed by the ordinary principles of construction.' General terms must give way to specific
terms.' Hence, where general terms exempt the insurer from liability for certain articles which are later specifically included in the
property insured, the insurer is bound.s It is well settled, also, that
where a condition in an insurance policy is ambiguous, it will be
construed in favor of the insured, 4 and where a term is open to

two constructions, equally fair, that will be adopted which will uphold the contract," or give the insured the greater indemnity,' since
'It is true that no actual threats of strike were made to McLachlan, but
as Beach, J., said in the disser.ting opinion, "Practically speaking, McLachlan
yielded because of the fear of a contest with the United Hatters and the
prospect of a strike in the background' p. 61.
"The ultimate purpose, of course, was to furnish steady employment for
union men. But there was an intention also to do certain things which would
help to achieve the ultimate purpose. So there was, it seems, conscious intention to persuade McLachlan to break his contract with the plaintiff and
other non-union finishing shops in order that the hats which, under the contract, should have gone to them. might be diverted to union shops.
IWatertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 84 Va. 72, 3 S. E. 876 (1887); Canton Ins. Office, Ltd. el at., v. Independent Transp. Co., 217 Fed. 213, 133 C. C.
A. 2o7 (1914).

'Joel v. Harvey, 5 Wcekly Rep. 488 (Eng. 1851); Furlong & lMfeloy v.
Ins. Co., r36 Iowa 468, 113 N W. io84 (sgo7); The Globe-Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co. v. Sherwin Williams Co, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. N. S. 390 (913).
The latter
case was subsequently dismissed in the Supreme Court by consent, at cost of
plaintiff-in-error.
Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 17 fo. App. 627 (s85) ;
Sloan v. Boston Ins. Co., 186 Ill. App. 8r (19i4).
'Vincent v. Pelican Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 Pa. Super. i (1918).
'Weed v. The Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 394, 31 N. F
231 (1892); McEvoy v. Security Fire Ins. Co., Ct a!.. ITO Md. 275, 73 AML
157 (i9o9); Brown et a!. v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 52 Ok]. 392, 153 Pac. 173
(1915); Bone v. Detroit National Fire Ins. Co, 26T Pa. 554, io4 AtL 742
(zgS).
See also Veber v. Inteiitate Business Men's Assn., 184 N. AV. 97
(N. D. I921).

'The
Note 2.

Globe-Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Sherwin Williams Co., .upra in
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the insurer made out the policy and is bound to make it clear. These
rules are inapplicable, however, where the terms are reasonably
clear.'

In every insurance contract there are certain statements made
by the insured, certain stipulations entered into and conditions imposed. These may appear either in the application or in the policy
itself. They fall into two classes: those amounting to (i) warranties, and (2) representations. In determining whether a misstatement is a warranty or a representation, the intent of the parties,
as expressed in the application or in the policy itself, must be ascertained- This has been reached in various ways. As a general rule,
statements which are part of the policy itself are regarded as warranties and, therefore, must be strictly true or the contract will be
rendered void.' A warranty, in insurance contracts, is regarded as
synonymous with condition and is construed as a condition prece-

dent, which must be complied with to the minutest detail.' This
treatment seems well established and generally accepted. 0 In view
of this attitude, the courts are reluctant to hold misstatements war-

ranties unless the parties clearly so intended and no other construction can be admitted."' The courts show the same reluctance even
though the policy declares that the statements are to be deemed
warranties. - Ordinarily, statements made in an application will not
be regarded as warranties, since they are not, strictly, part of the
policy itself, but serve as the foundation upon which the contract is

'Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 33 Times L R. j8 (Eng. i9i6); Tamatin v. Ins. Co. of North America, 68 Pa. Super. 614 (i9i8); Interstate Business Men's Ass'n. v. Lewis, 257 Fed. 24r, 168 C. C. A. 335 (19g9). But where
a special provision is susceptible of only one construction inevitably leading
to an absurd or unreasonable result and substantially defeating the object of
the contract, it will he rejected as inoperative. See Rathbun v. Globe Indemnity Co., 184 N. IV. 9o3 (Neb. i92).
First N'ational Bank, etc., v. Tns. -Co. of North America, 5o N. Y. 45
(1872); I-anrahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 72 N. J. L. 5o4, 63 AtI. 28o
(xpo6) ; Monicur v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 269 Pa. 213, 112 AtL 476
(z921). Cf. Dimick v. 'Metropolitan Lije Ins. Co., 6o N. J. L. 384, 5 AtL
291 (1903).

But see Blackstone v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 1O7 Tex. io;

474 S. W. 82, (1915). A number of states have enacted statutes which have
modified this strict common law rule. See Joyce, Insurance (--nd ed. 1917),
Vol. 3, p. 3ro4, et seq. The Pennsylvania statute is the Act of June 23, x85,
P. L 134.
'See *Maddox v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 56 Mo. App. 343 (1894); 15
1{ARV. L

Rev. 739 (191o-19o2)

; 64 U. oF P.,. L. REv. 3Z4 (915-j196).

Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Mitchell & Boyle, 48 Pa. 367 (1864); Byers v. In-.
Co., 35 Ohio 606 23,o) ; Donley v. Glen Falls Ins. Co, 184 N. Y. 107, 76 N.
E. 914 (r9o6); Mumaw v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 97 Ohio r,
119 N. E. 13Z (1917).

" Mann v. Supreme Council, 2c6 Ill. App. 92

(1917).

"Erikson v. Merchants Ins. Co., 2o9 Ill. App. 342 (1918).
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based and are collateral thereto.13 If the application is made a part
in the application
of the policy itself, however, or if the statements
are warranted to be true, they are warranties.1'
Can a policy be avoided where a misstatement in an application
has been made and such is not a warranty? The answer fnvolves a
further inquiry-whether the representation is or is not material to
the risk. If it is material to the risk, the contract may be avoided,"
but if not material and substantially true, such is not. sufficient
ground for avoiding the policy.1" If the contract expressly provides
that the falsity of any statement in the application will avoid the
policy, such is binding regardless of the materiality of the statement."' The effect is the same as if, by incorporation into the contract, the representation became a warranty. In this event, its materiality is not to be attacked, since the question of materiality in a
warranty is precluded. If the representation be false, though made
in good faith, it will avoid the policy if the representation is material to the risk.1 '
With respect to answers to questions set forth in the application, courts differ as to the effect of a misrepresentation. Some
courts have held that where the insurer requested information,
amounting to a representation, the answer thereto was conclusively
presumed to be material to the risk.10 Others have said It would be
treated as a material fact, since the asking of the question indicated
Donley v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., supra in Note 1o; Flenner el a. v. Capital
217 Ill. App. 529 (ig9o).
" Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Benton, 87 Ind. 132 ('i&R); Modern Woodmen,
etc. v. Atcheson, 219 S. %V.537 (Tex. 192o). But see Smyly v. Globe & Rutgers Ins. Co. 13 S. E. 220 (Ga. 1922) where it was held the policy was not
avoided, though the insured warranted the property was not mortgaged when
in fact it was.
'See the following cases: Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mfullan el aL., 1o7 Md.
; Merchants Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 66 Ind. App.
45Y, 69 AtI. 385 (cig)
567, iS N. E. 576 (1918); Blackstone v. Life Ins. Co, supra in Note a As
to when a fact is material to the risk, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Golden
et al., 188 Ky. 742 (i92o); Kerpchap v. Ins. Co, 117 AtI 836 (N. J. 19n).
"'Ebner v. Ohio State Ins. Co., 69 Ind. App. 324, 121 N. E. 315 (7918);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 133 N. E. 405 (Ind. 191).
" Wilkinson v. Standard Ins. Co, i8o Cal. 252, io Pac. 607 (r919). See
also Germier v. Springfield Ins. Co., To9 La. 341, 33 So. 361 (1903), and
Deming Investment Co. v. Shawnee Ins. Co., 16 Okl. 1, 83 Pac. 918 (i90).
"Armour et al. v. Transatlantic Ins. Co, 90 N. Y. 450 (1882); Carrollton Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., ITS Fed. 7;f, 52 C. C. A. 671
(1902); Travelers' Ass'n. v. Belote, 21 Ga. App. 6io, 94 S. E. 834 (1918).
.4 fortiori if the truth of the statement is warranted. Morris v. Imperial Ins.
Co., xo6 Ga. 461, 32 S. E. 595 (1898).
"Snare & Triest Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 258 Fed. 425, 169 C. C. A.
'

Ins. Co.,

441 (1919).
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that the parties so deemed it.20 Others have held that such answers
are warranties.2 - I The ultimate effect, however, is the same, in that
false answers to specific inquiries are regarded as sufficient to avoid
the policy. Where a representation made by an applicant is expressly made a part of the contract, it becomes a warranty and its
materiality is settled by the agreement of the parties.2 - Answers to
questions in a life insurance application, which are stated to be the
basis of the contract, are warranties and, if false, render the policy
void." This is true, also, where the policy mentions several things
which are "warranted," though the questions and answers are not
included therein. 2 4
A N\ell recognized distinction appears between life insurance
and the various other forms of insurance, in that the parties are
not permitted .to stipulate what facts or representations shall be
In accident or fire indeemed material in life insurance policies.2
surance, however, the parties may make such stipulations and the
courts will not assume to interfere with the understanding of the
parties as to the materiality thereof,20 nor will such stipulations put
the representations on a footing with warranties. 7
An interesifig question is presented in connection with overvaluation of the property insured. In the absence of fraud, some
courts have held that over-valuation will not affect the right to recover.'$ This has been held even though the value is made specifically a warranty.2' Other courts have decided that if such statements are false, they will avoid the policy if specifically made a warranty. 0 The reason given for upholding the contract in spite of
such a misstatement is that valuation is a matter of opinion.
-Myers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 83 W. Va. 39o, 98 S. F. 424 (i919);
Smith v. North American Ins. Co., 2o5 Pac. Sot (Nev. 192).
' Federal Life Ass'n. v. Smith, 86 Ill. App. 427 (i89).
"' Holland v. Western Union Ins. Co., 58 Wash. too, 1o7 Pac. 866 (i9O).
'Thomson v. Weems, 9 A. C. 671 (Eng. 2884); Schofield's Adm'rx. v.
Metropolitan Ins. Co., 79 Vt. x6r, 64 Atl. xi07 (i9o6).
"Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L C. 484 (Eng. 1853); Holland v. Western Union Ins. Co., supra in -Note 22.
'See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullan et at., supra in Note i5, and Smith
v. North American Ins. Co., supra n Note 2o.
' Bank of Cotton Valley v. McInnis ct aL, 143 La. 436, 78 So. 727 (1918).
' See Smith v. North American Ins. Co., supra in Notes go and 25.
"Franklin Ins. Co. v. Vaughan, 92 U. S. 516, 23 L. ed. 740 (x875) ; National Bank v. Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563-(877); Harrington v.
Fitchburg Ins. Co., iz4 Mass. 126 (1878); Morotock Ins. Co. v. Fostoria
Novelty Co., 94 Va. 361, --6 S. E. 85o (1897).
" Rogers ct at. v. The Phoenix In-. Co., 12! Ind. 57o, 23 N. E. 108
(1889).
' Maddox v. Dwellinig House Ins. Co.. supra in Note 9, Shelden v. Michigan, etc., Is. Co., 12.1 Mich. 303, 82 N. W. ;o 68 (igoo).
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The case of Dau-sons, Linfitcd 'v. Bonnn, 31 presents a situation
upon which the members of the court differed widely as to the effect
of a misstatement and as to the construction of the contract. A
motor lorry was insured against fire. The policy itself recited that
the proposal (application) should be the basis of the contract and
that it was issued subject to a condition that any material misstatement (material to assessing the premium, in this case) should render
the policy void. The proposal contained a number of questions,
including the address at which the lorry would usually be garaged.
By inadvertence, an erroneous address was given. The lorry xwas
destroyed by fire and the insurers resisted payment on the ground
of the misstatement as to the garage. The court held the insurers
were not bound, resting its decision on the ground that the recital in
the policy that the proposal should be the basis of the contract made
the validity of the policy conditional upon the truth of the answers
contained in the proposal, irrespective of their materiality. It was
also held that the express condition was inapplicable, since it was
not proved that the misstatement was material to the assessment of
the premium.3 2 Though the case is troublesome, and the decision
seems based upon a very strict interpretation of the condition, yet
such was the agreement of the parties.
H. R. H.
SOME NEW ASPEcTS OF THE EIGIITEENTu AMENDMENT AND

D ACT.-The Eighteenth Amendment' to the Constitution of the United States prohibits the manufacture, sale or
transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes and the
National Prohibition Act-" (Volstead Act) Sec. 26, authorizes the
forfeiture of any vehicle transporting such liquors after the persons
in charge thereof have been convicted under the act. The question
as to what constitutes the transportation of liquor has not been answered by the Federal Courts. but cases have arisen under state laws
similarly prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquors which
may indicate the reaction of the Federal Courts.
THE VOLST

:,-8 Times

'The

L. R. 836 (Eng. x922).
court was divided, there being two dissenting opinions on the

ground that the case was governed by the condition with respect to the mis-tatement. "The mistatement not being material to assessing the premium, the
insurer, they concluded, should be bound.
. The Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, See. t,

provides: "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from, the United States and all tern:ory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited."
-4i Stat, at L. 305, Fed. Stat. Ann. 2o2 (i9ig).
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Thus, carrying liquor in a handbag was held not to be transportation within Mont. Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) C. 9, Sec. 26, which
is identical with Section 26 of the National Prohibition Act
Putting a friend's bottle of liquor in one's pocket while riding in his
automobile was held not to be transportation, but it was transporting liquor for the owner of an automobile to take a drink from a
jug of whiskey and then place the jug in the bottom of the automobile, although he did not know who owned it or how it came to be
there.4" However, the fact that the owner of an automobile had in
his pocket a bottle of whiskey was insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the automobile was being used in transporting liquor
and hence subject to forfeiture. 5 A domestic animal was held nQt
to be a vehicle of transportation and subject to condemnation because used to carry liquors on it back.6 Transportation of liquor
has been held an offense though it was not for the purpose of
sale.7

In addition to the manufacture, sale and transportation of liquor
prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment, the National Prohibition
Act prohibits its possession' except as authorized by the act and
makes possession prina fade evidence that it was being kept for the
purpose of being sold, putting the burden of proof on the possessor
to prove that its possession was lawfulV The act does not, however,
make mere possession a crime, which would be beyond the power
delegated to Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment, as being legislation unnecessary to accomplish the purpose of the amendment 10
and as not reasonably adapted to the enforcement of the prohibition
against the unlawful manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors."1 The burden of proving that the possession of liquor
is lawful is on the possessor in a criminal prosecution as well as in
a civil action.1 2
In order to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act,2 3 for almost every offense it is necessary
'State ex rel. Neville v. Mullen et a., -o7 Pac. 634 (MVont.

1922).

'Locke v. City of Ft. Smith, 244 S. W. ix (Ark r922).
" Green v. Comm., 23 S. NV. 917 (Ky. 1922).
Tutton v. State, 110 S. E. 455 (Ga. z922).
State v. One Black Torse Mule, 92 So. 548 (Ala. 1922).
'Cecil v. State, 243 S. W. 988 (Tex. 1922).
'41 Stat. at L .3o8, Fed. Stat. Ann. _o2 (1919), Sec. 3.
41 Stat. at L 317, Fed. Stat. Ann. 202 (T919), Sec. 33.
"U. S. v. Dowling, 278 Fed. 6.3o (D. C. $. D. Fla. i922). See 71 U. oF PA.
L. RFv. 9t, 92 (Nov. i922).
" Page v. U. S, 278 Fed. 41 (9th C. C. A. 1922).

"Dillon v. U. S. 2;9 Fed. 639 (zid C. C. A. 1921); Sharp v. U. S.. 28
Fed. 86 (sth C. C. A. 1922). Contra. U. S. v, Cl!vcland, 281 Fed. 249 (D. C.
S. D. Ala. 1922).
is41 Stat. at L. .3oS, Fed. Stat. Ann. 202 (igg).
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to produce the liquor. To this end, property must be searched and
seized. Owing to the overzeal of some enforcement officers and
the difficulty of swearing out proper warrants, 14 much illegallyobtained evidence has been offered to the courts. The question
as to whether such evidence should be received had been answered
affirmatively by the great majority of the state courts,"5 and this
had become the settled rule 11 until the Supreme Court of the
United States reverted.to the doctrine of Boyd v. United States,1 '
and in Weeks z,. United Statcs "I held that not only was such seizure
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and an unlawful act but since
the defendant had seasonably moved a return of the illegally obtained
evidence it should not have been used against him.
Since the Eighteenth Amendment, the violations of the Fourth
Amendment have become of interest to a wider circle than before,
including many not ordinarily deemed "undesirable citizens." 19 Perhaps on this account, the invasion of one's home has been deemed
more heinous and its inviolability held more sacred. Whatever the
reason, the restriction laid down in the Wceks Casc, under which
evidence is excluded only when its return has been demanded before
trial, has been disregarded by the Supreme Court in dealing with
cases in which liquor was taken from the defendant's home and,
apparently returning the whole way to the Boyd Casc, it held in
Amos v. U. S.2- that although a motion for the return of the liquor
seized had not been made until after the jury had been sworn, yet
its admission as evidence had been improper. The Supreme Court,
however, limited this application of the Fourth Amendment to governmental action and held that it did not operate to prevent the
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects agairist unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
-Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmations, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.'
"People v. Adams. 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (i0o3), affirmed in Adams
v. New York. 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. ed. 575, 25 Sup. Ct. 372 (094) (seizure
of papers) ; Chastaing v. State, 83 Ala. 2, 3 So. 304 (:887) (pistol); Cluett
v. Rosenthall, zoo-Mich. z93, 58 N. W. ioop (1894) (books); State v. Pomeroy,
130 Mo. 489. 32 S. W. :10 (18%) (lottery tickets); Williams v. State, :oo
Ga. 511. 28 S. E. 624 (897) (liquor).
it has long been established that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the party has been
enabled to obtain the evidence." Wigmore, "Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure," 8 A.,t. B.,R Ass',. JOURNAL 479 (August, 1922).
"1116 U. S. 6j6, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (:886) (documents ob-

tained unlawfully by an officer could be excluded from evidence).
i232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (79T4).
"Wigmore, "Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure,"
srupra in Note :6.
22'-55 U. S. 3t 3 , 65 L. ed. 654, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (192:).
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admission of evidence illegally obtained by private persons 2 or by
state officers " and subsequently offered by Federal agents to Federal Courts.
The majority of recent state and Federal decisions hold that,
although there may be an action for damages against the officer, the
illegally obtained liquor may be offered in evidence. The lower
Federal 2 ' Courts thus restrict Amos v. U. S. 2- to its facts and exBurdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 6s L ed. 1048, 41 Sup. Ct. S74

(29i2), Zo U. op PA. L Rav. 54 (9g2-2z).
'U. S. v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1922) (police seized
liquor and turned it over to prohibition officers); McGrew et al. v. U. S, 281
Fed. 8og (gth C. C. A. z922) (sheriff seized liquor from defendant's automobile
and instead of returning it to defendant as ordered by state court turned it
over to prohibition officer).
' State v. Anderson, 3r Idaho 5x4, 174 Pac. 1z4 (2918) (sheriff illegally
stopped and searched defendant's automobile for liquor; the evidence was
admissible) ; State v. Quinn, iii S. C. 174, 97 S. E. 6z (igi8) (drunken man
in a car arrested without a warrant, liquor found on him held admissible);
Benson v. State, 233 S. W. 758 (Ark. z92i) (defendant's home was searched
without a warrant; the liquor found was held admissible, the court approving Wigmore's theory that the illegality of the act of seizure should not affect the admissibility of the evidence) ; State v. Simmons, no S. E. 591 (N.
C. 1922) (handbag seized and liquor taken without warrant; the liquor "was
admissible); Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. Tgzz) (automobile stopped
and searched witlout a warrant; liquor found therein admissible); Sioux
Falls v. Nraker, z87 N. W. 821 (S. D. g"z=)
(liquor seized under an invalid
warrant; admissible); State v. Mullen, 2 Pac. 634 (Mont. 1922) (sheriff
seized liquor in handbag; admissible) ; Kennemer v. State, iT3 S. E. 55T (Ga.
1922) (liquor obtiained by illegal search is admissible. Amos v..U. S. not
binding on state courts); Commonwealth v. Shultz, i Dist. & Co, Rep. 742
-(Pa. 1922) (sheriff with warrant of arrest, but no search warranf, seized
liquor in defendant's home; the liquor was admitted ii evidence; this case is
contra on identical facts to Youman v. Commonwealth, infra in Note 26).
Dillon v. U. S., 279 Fed. 639 (2d C. C. A. ig2a)(prohibition agents entered defendant's public bar and there saw and seized a bdttle of whiskey without warrant; admissible); Elrod v. Moss, =78 Fed. 123 (4th C. C. A. i92i)
(officer made the seizure without warrant when he saw and smelled the liquor;
admissible); O'Connor v.A. S., _-8i Fed. 396 (D. C. N. J. x922) (officers lawfully entered place of business open to public, saw and smelled liquor, and
seized it without warrant; admissible) ; Vachina v. U. S, 283 Fed. 3q (gth
C. C. A. !922) (liquor in plain sight seized from defendant on the street; admissible) ; U. S. v. Snyder, 278 Fed. 65o (D. C. N. D. XV. Va. i92) (defendant's bulging pockets revealed liquor; taken from him without warrant;
admissible) : U. S. v. Bateman. 278 Fed. 211 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 292) (Volstead
Act impliedly recognizes right to search automobiles for liquor without a
warrant: liquor so found held admissible); Lambert v. U. S.. 282 Fed. 43
(nth C. C. A. 1922) (liquot seized without warrant from defendant's automobile held to be not an unreasonable search and seizure within meaning of
Fourth Amendment); U. S. v. Boasburg 283 Fed. 3o5 (D. C.-E. D. La. 1922)
(defendant's home was searched without a proper warrant and liquor found,
on affidavit of such fact a second wanant was obtained and the liquor seized;
the first search was held to be unlawful and the liquor seized must be returned. Amos v. U. S. followed.)
" Supra in Note 2o.
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dude the liquor as evidence only when it has been taken from the
defendant's home and not wben it had been seized on his person or
in his vehicle. Although not bound by the decision of the Supreme
Court, most of the states in their constitutions have provisions similar
to the Fourth Amendment and, being inclined to give weight to its
decision, many state courts have not only considered the seizure of
liquor without a warrant or without probable cause illegal but have
also refused its admission even when not taken by invasion of the
defendant's home. 2s In Ash v. Conmzwnwcalth,27 where the defendants suitcase was seized and searched for liquor without a warrant,
the court reviews the history of the conditions which brought about
the insertiori in the Federal Constitution of the Fourth Amendment
and like provisions in most of the state constitutions, and says that it
is the duty of the courts "to allow no encroachment thereon, and
to say of those otherwise disposed what was said by the French
of the Germans at the battle of Verdun, 'They shall not pass,' since
the prevention of the advancement of the Germans at that battle was
no more essential to thepreservation of the liberties of France . . .
than is the prevention of the encroachment upon the constitutional
provision . . . essential to the continued perpetuity of our constitutional liberty."
It is unquestionably true that a civil action against the prohibition officer for damages is a hopelessly inadequate safeguard against
violation of the Fourth Amendment. This consideration has led
many courts to hold the evidence so found inadmissible, thus penalizing the Eighteenth Amendment to protect the Fourth. The solution seems to be that suggested by a bill introduced in the 66th
Congress 28 making it a criminal offense for an" official to commit
illegal searches and seizures. This would put "teeth" in the Fourth
Amendment and thus sufficiently protected, its enforcement would
no longer be at the expense of the Eighteenth.
G. W. G.
M
Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S. W. 6oD(Ky. 192o) (sheriff with warrant of arrest but no search warrant seized liquor in defendant's home; evidence so obtained is inadmissible-this case is contra on identical facts to
Commonwealth v. Shultz, supra in Note 23) ; Ash v. Commonwealth, 236 S. W.
T032 (Ky. 1922) (suitcase seized and searched for liquor: evidence so obtained is admissible); People v. Margelis, 186 N. W. 488 (Mich. 1922) (liquor
taken from defendant's pocket is inadmissible): State v. Gibbons. 2D3 Pac.
39o (Wash. 1922) (seizure of liquor from defendant's automobile without
-warrant; inadmissible) ; Butler v. State, 93 So. 3 (Miss. 1922) (evidence obtained by officers by searching defendant's automobile without a warrant and
over his objection is inadmissible).
Supra in Note 26.
'66th Congress, 2d Sess., H. R. Y281&
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THE NATURE OF LIMITFD LIABILITY UNDER TIE" UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Ac-r.-One of the chief purposes of the Uni-

form Limited Partnership Act was to prevent persons who honestly believed themselves to be limited partners in a firm from being
held unlimitedly liable because of some technicality.' Recently, in
a United States Circuit Court case in Illinois, it was sought to make
the Act a means of effecting this particular situation it was designed
to prevent.
In In re Marcuse & Co.2 seven persons planned to form a
limited partnership for the brokerage business under the old Illinois Limited Partnership Act.3 A and B were to be the general
partners, and C, D, E, F, and G, the special partners, and agreements were drawn up to this effect. It was then discovered that no
firm having more tfian two special partners could do business on the
New York Stock Exchange. Accordingly a new agreement was
drawn up with A and B as general partners*and C and D as special partners. The contributions credited to C and D were the same
as originally contributed by all five special partners, and the contributions of E, F and G were held in trust for them by C and D.
A certificate designed to comply with the old act was drawn up,
but was not filed until the day after the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act became effective and the old act repealed.' The firm transacted
business from July, 1917, until Mlarch, 1920, when a bankruptcy
petition was filed. The creditors of the firm sought to hold C and
D as general partners, claiming that no limited partnership had been
formed, since the certificate filed was not in compliance with the
Uniform Act,5 and the act forbade the formation of limited partnerships for the brokerage business.1 C and D immediately paid
back all the profits and interest they had received froth the firm,
seeking to take advantage of Section 'i

of the Uniform Act,? which

reads: "A person who has contributed to the capital of a business
conducted by a person or partnership erroneously believing that he
has become a limited partner in a limited partnership, is not, by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited partner, a general
partner with the person or in the partnership carrying on the busi-.
ness, or bound by the obligations of such person or partnership; provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces his
interest in the profits of the business, or other compensation by way
'See the expllan'orv note preceding the Act in the pamplet of the Commissioners (rn,6). See also the article by William Dfaper Lewis, draftsman
of the act, in 65 U. oi"PA. L RFv. 724 (916-17).
2281 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 1922).
*Jones & Addington, l11. Stat. Ann. 1913, chap. 84.
*Cahill, Rev. St. Ill.,
1921. c. io6 (a) par. 45-75.
Id.. par. 46. Section 2 of the Act.
* Id., par. 47. Section 3 of the Act.
Id., par. 55.
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of income." Under this proviso an interesting question arises:
whether it is necessary for a person erroneously believing himself
a limited partner to pay back all past profits and interest to avoid
being held liable as a general partner, or whether he need only renounce all further interest in the profits of the business. The Act
does not specifically provide for the repayment of past *profits, but
merely declares that "his.interest in the profits" must be renounced,
and it would seem that this clearly means interest in profits not paid
over. The court in the Marcuse Case, however, did not have to decide this point, as it was not contended that the compliance with this
provision of the act %vas insufficient; in the words of the court it
was a compliance "to the fullest extent." The court did say there
might be some ambiguity in the proviso of Section ii, but it is submitted, the words are perfectly clear, for a person can hardly be
said to have an interest in profits he has already received. He has
the profits themselves. The interest he has is in profits not yet paid
over. Clearly, therefore, it was not necessary for C and D to pay
back all their past profits to comply with Section ii.
Other'sections of the .Act support this construction. Section
xo,l which enumerates the rights of a limited partner, provides in
sub-section (2) : "A limited partner shall have the right to receive
a share of the profits or other compensation by way of income . , ," Manifestly a right to receive a share of the profits
relates to profits not yet paid over, and this is the right the partner
is required to renounce by Section i i. For is not an interest in
profits the right to receive a share in those profits? Again, Section
ig," relating to the assignment of a limited partner's interest, after
stating that it is assignable, enumerates the rights of an assignee
who does not become a substituted limited partner. Sub-section (3)
provides: ". . . he is only entitled to receive the share of the
profits or other compensation by way of income . . . to which
his vssignor would otherwise be entitled." Here the assignee gets
one of the rights of the limited partner, which is to receive his share
of the profits. What is this right but an interest in the profits?
SurelV it would not be said that this refers to any past profits that
have been paid over, for if it did it would require the assignor to
pay over all past profits to his assignee, and such a construction is
inconceivable.
The creditors in the Marcuse Case, however, claimed that C
and D could not take advantage of Section ii,as it applied only to
firms attempted to be formed under the Act, and the Act expressly
prohibits 0the formation of a limited partnership for the brokerage
business.' The court, however, decided that the application of this

'Id., par. 54.
'Id., par. 63.
)See Note 6, .spra.
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section vas not thus limited." With reference to the purpose of
the Act, the Court said: "This section is not designed to amend or
correct or perfect the limited partnership organization, 'so that it
may thereafter continue as such, but looks rather to a termination
of the relation, and relief from general liability on compliance with
the terms of the section in all those cases where persons erroneously
believed they had become limited partners, without regard to whether
or not the belief was induced by suppdsed compliance with- this or
any other act. This view not only comports with the words of the
section, but with the evident general purpose of the act to give
effect, so far as may be done, to the bona fide intent of the parties,
and to relieve from the extreme consequences of honest mistakes,
which the prior law and its strict interpretation entailed." 15
The original purpose of limited partnerships, which grew up in
the civil law, was to enable persons to contribute a limited amount
of capital to a business without being liable for more than that
nmount and thus to encourage trade by opening up a new. source of
capital."3 When adopted in this country an additional incident was
added for the protection of those dealing with the firm, viz., the
general liability of a limited partner for non-compliance with the
Most courts treated the limited partnership statutes as
statutes."
being in derogation of the common law, and so required strict compliance with them as a prerequisite to what they considered a privilege, namely, limited liability." In a few cases, however, the courts
were satisfied with substantial compliance," or reasonable compliance.17 Still other courts applied the statutes as they were originally
intended to be applied,2a namely, rigorously in behalf of those who
suffered by th6ir violation, but with -a. wise discrimination where a
However, the
creditor sought to obtain an undue advantage.'
'The court said on p. 935: "But Section ri is very broad in its terms.
It is not limited to instances where there has been an attempted compliance
with the new act. It includes in its terms any person who at any time contributed to a partnership, erroneously believing himself to be a limited partner."

"p. 936.
See Note x, sut'ra.

"See Bates, Limited Partnership. 26 (1886).
"Jacquin v. Buisson, i Hbw..Pr. 38i (N. Y. r8S) ; Richardson v. Hogg,
38 Pa. x; (T861); In re Merrill, 12 Blatch. 221 (Fed. 1874). In the case
of Argall v. Smith, 3 Denio 435 (N. Y. si&16), the court said "such conditions
must be substantially and even strictly complied with."
"Singer v. Kelly, 44 Pa. 145 (t863); Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 463
(1868); Van Riper v. Poppenhausen, 43 N. Y. 68 (1870); Webster v. Lanum,
137 Fed. 376 (C. C. A. i9o5).
"Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer, 108 N. Y. 578, is N. 1. 712 (I888).
See Bates, Limited Partnership, 24 (0886).

"Lachaise v. Marks, 4 E. D. Smith 61o (N. Y. 1855); Levy v. Locl4 47

How. Pr. 394 (N. Y. 1874).

ERRATA.
Page 153, line 12. "representatives" should be representations.
The second paragraph, page 164. "In an early Massachusetts case," a church member was dropped from the roll
because of his non-attendance. This was done according
to a.by-law of the organization. The civil court took jurisdiction and decreed that the injured member be reinstated.
In that case, etc. . . .
Page i74. Interchange first and second lines at top of
page.
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general effect of all the statutes as interpreted was to make a part-

her a general partner unless he coimplied at least substantially with
the limited partnership statute. Limited partnerships thus came to
be looked on more as a trap than as a convenient mode of conduct-

ing business, and they practically lost their usefulness.:

M

The aim of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was to restore
this usefulness by removing the fear-of unlimited liability. In the
first place, it provides that the rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law shall be strictly construed, shall have no application."
Further, it never makes a limited partner unlimitedly liable except
in certain enumerated cases, these being where the creditor has beer
misled by the limited partner's representatives," or where he has
exercised control in the business.23 Then there is Section ii, which
affords further protection to those desiring limited liability.
It is thus very evident that one of the main purposes of the
Act is to do away with the general liability of a limited partner
except where fair dealing -requires that he be held unlimitedly liable.
Its application in the 2larcuse Case is an example of its *alutary
effect, for it would have been clearly inequitable to have held the
special partners unlimitedly liable. They had not misled the creditors, nor had they taken any part in the management of the firm.
A few more decisions like that in the instant case, demonstrating the
effective and just way in which the Act 'covers the situation of
limited liability, will undoubtedly increase the popularity of limited
partnerships in those states that have the Uniform Act.

H. B. C., Jr.
THE Ca& REQUIRrD oF RAILROADS AND TRAVELrRs oN PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS AT GRADE CRossINms.-In order to approach this problem
properly it is necessary to understand what is meant by a highway
crossing- "Strictly speaking, a highway crossing may be defined as
the space included within the boundaries of the right of way and
the boundaries of the highway." I This definition, however, is too
narrow, since a highway crossing is often regarded as including.
enough space on both sides of the railroad's right of way to afford
the traveler a safe approach and departure from its crossing. 2 This
'See Note I, .upra.
' Cahill, Rev. St. Ill, x921, c. io6 (a) Par. 7a. Section 28 of the Act.
"Id., pars. 49 and So. Sections 5 (2) and 6 of the Act.
'Id., par. Sr. Section 7 of the Act.
'Elliott, Railroads (2d ed. 19o7), Vol. 3, 26.
*Collier v. Georgia R. R. Co., 76 Ga. 61 t:(1886); Lake Erie. etc. R. R. Co.
v. Shelley, 163 Ind. 36, 7x N. F- 15, (1904). Where a street in a city is used
mostly in the day and very little at night, it is none the less a public crossing, and the railroad must use proper care *notto injure persons using the
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latter conception has been found to be more satisfactory in solving
the practical problem of determining the nature and extent of a
public crossing, as the area in which the railroad will be held liable
for injuries inflicted upon persons using such a crossing is not limited to the space of the tracks, but extends to a safe approach to
and departure from the company's right of way.
Both the traveler on a public highway at a grade crossing and
the railroad have certain mutual rights and duties. Each has the
right to use his way of travel, but in the exercise of such right,
each owes a duty not to encroach upon the right of the other.'
Strictly speaking, neither the railroad nor the public has a higher
right than the other in the use of a grade crossing. The practical
result, however, is that railroad trains from the very nature of their
operation take precedence over a person using a grade crossing.
The speed with which trains have to be operated and the nature 6f
railroad traffic make it essential*that the traveler should stop and
allow the trains to pass, rather than force the company unnecessarily
to slow down its traffic.' The duty on the part of the traveler to
yield to the trains of a company does not in any way limit. the
obligation of the railroad to give timely warning of its trains' approach. Its failure so to warn is not negligence per sc, but the lack
of- such a warning must be shown to have been the proximate cause
of a specified injury to render the railroad liable, and. it must also
appear that the traveler was not guilty of contributory negligence.5
Since each party owes a duty of care, how are we to measure
the degree of care that is owed by each? It seems that.both the
company and the traveler are required to use only ordinary care.
It is generally stated that by ordinary care is meant that care which
"a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily exercise under the circumstances." 0 Such a rule is a very broad one, and is, in its list
analysis, dependent largely upon the surrounding circumstances of
each case. The amount of care may thus vary at different grade
crossings, depending upon the risk that the crossing involves. Such
crossing at night. McWilliams v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App.
318, 157 S. W. 1001 (1913).
' Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Converse, 139 U. S. .169, 3 L-cd. 213, 11 Sup. Ct.
569 (i89o); Weller v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 225 Pa. 1io, 73 At!. 10z4 (io9);
Cox v. Illinois Centra! R. Co., 142 Ky 478, 134 S. 1%r.9H (1g1).
'Continental Imp. Co. v. Stead. 95 U. S. I6r, 24 L ed. 403 (1877); Hendrickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 49 Minn. 245, 51 .V.V. 1o44 (1892); McCracken v. Consolidated Traction Co., 201 Pa. 378, 50 Atl.83o (19o).
'Huntress v. Boston, etc.. R. R. Co., 66 N. H. 185, 34 AtI. 154 (189o');
Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Riddle, 24 Ky. L R. z687, 72 S. V. 22 (1903);
Anspach v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 223 Pa. 528, 74 AtI. 373 (1909).
'Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Cody, z66 U. S. 6o6, 41 I. ed. 1132, 11 Sup. Ct.
703 (i8;6); Bower v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 6i Wis. 457, 21 N. NV. 536 (1884);
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. 'McClurg, 59 Fed. 86o, 8 C. C. A. 322 (i894).
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risk or danger may be brought about by many conditions extraneous
to the actual physical crossing, but surrounding it; such as, the
topography of the land, the size of the community, any obstructions
near the tracks limiting a clear view of them, and many other situations that enhance the danger of crossing.?
The above general rule as to the required degree of care includes
the basic principle that any reasonable person before attempting to
pass over a grade crossing will at least look and listen. This requirement does not seem to be an unreasonable one. It does not in
the least lower the right of a traveler on a public highway to make
use of the crossing along with the railroad, as such a requirement
arises fundamentally from the relative importance involved in the
different public uses. In some jurisdictions the duty, to look and
listen is an absolute one, and if this duty is disregarded under any
circumstances, it is negligence as a matter of law, and not -merely
evidence of .-negligence.' This rule is too rigid, however, as there
are a number of circumstances under which a person should not be
deemed guilty of contributory negligence because of his failure to
look and listen before attempting to pass over a crossing. Thus
he is excused from looking and listening where an employee of the
railroad gives him reasonable assurance that he may safely cross,'
and where to look and listen would be useless because of the railroad's negligence."
It is the surrounding facts of the accident, under the "look and
listen" doctrine, that show whether or not the plaintiff has exercised
the proper quanttut

of care to excuse him from contributory negli-

gence. Thus the question of the proper distance from a crossing
for a traveler to look and listen is an important element in a case,
but this can not be fixed by any definite mathematical rule. The test
is whether the person exercised ordinary care in the selection of the
place from which he looked and listened. The result is that the
proper place for a traveler to look and listen wili vary according to
the surroundings of each crossing.10 The duty to look and listen
'Ellis v. Lake Shore. etc., R. Co., 138 Pa. 5o6, 21 Ad. 140 (i&o); Cowles
v. New York. etc., R. Co., So Conn. 48, 66 Atl. 1o2o (go7); Follanire v.
Michigan United R. Co., 157 Mich. 159, 121 N. V. 8i (igog); Lake Erie,
etc., R. Co. v. Moore, 51 Ind. App. 110 (1912); United Rys. & Elec. Co. of

Baltimore v. Crain, 123 Md. 332, 91 At. 405 (194).
'Bush v. Union Pacific R. Co., 62 Kan. 7o9, 64 Pac. 624 (19o); Long v.
Pacific, etc., P Co., 74 Ore. 5o2, 145 Pac. xo68 (19t$).
'Cooper v. North Carolina R. Co., 140 N. C. 209, 52 S. 1. 932 (1905);
Louisville, etc, . Co. v. Miller, 134 Ky. 716, 121 S. W. 648 (19o9).
" St. Louis L 1. & S. R. Co. v. Hitt. 76 Ark. 227, 88 S. W. 9o8 0905). " Lynch v. Northern P. R. Co., i76 U. S. 701, 43 L. ed. i i8, Ig Sup. Ct.
878 (1899); Winter v. New York & L. B. R. Co. 66 N. J. L 677, o AtL 339
(i9o) ; Calhoun v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 223 Pa. 298, 72 At]. 54 (I9o9). It
was negligence per se for a traveler to cross tracks at a grade crossing hidden
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does not cease at the first effort, but it is a-general rule that a

person must continue to exerise these pifcautions tintil danger of a
collision is past. The chief consideration in all these cases is whether
or not, under all the facts, the plaintiff has been. guilty of such
contributory negligence as to bar his recovery. Where the facts are
clear and unquestioned as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence
the courts will decide usually, as a matter of law that the company
is not liable. Otherwise the question of contributory negligence is
for the jury except in jurisdictions that have prescribed the exact
amount of care necessary to be used by a traveler as a matter of
law."'
Under the "look and listen" doctrine it is often incumbent upon.
the traveler also to stop where the surrounding circumstances make
it essential in order either to see or hear properly. The weight of
authority is that a person is under no obligation to stop unless the
danger of the crossing demands it for his own safety. His failure to
stop is.'usually regarded as a mixed question- of law and fact, and
not a pure question of law. " The Pennsylvania courts have extended
this requirement of stopping at a crossing to embrace all cases no
matter what is the nature of the crossing. Thus, under the law in
Pennsylvania, unless a driver of a vebicle uses all three of the precautions of stopping, looking, and listening in "a substantial and
careful manner" at a grade crossing, lie is guilty of contributory
negligence that will prevent his recovery. 5 This rule seems to place
an unnecessary burden upon the traveler on a public highway where
the crossing is in no way obstructed, and a clear view can be had of
by smoke. The court said he should have waited for a clear view. Lortz v. New
York C. & H. R. R. Co., 83 Hun: 27x, 3X N. Y. S. io33 (894).
'Austin v. Long Island R. Co., i4o N. Y. 639, 23 N. Y. S. z93 (1893);
Gangawer v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co, 168 Pa. 265, 32 AtL 2r (1895);
Proper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., x6 Mich. 352, 99 N W. 283 (19o4);
Hatcher v. McDermott, 1o3 Md. 78, 63 Atl. 214 (i9o6); Walsh v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 222 Pa. i62, 70 AtL io88 (1x98). It was said to be a question
for the jury where a blinding rain and electrical storm obscured the tracks,
and the traveler listened eight feet from the tracks. Louisville & N. R. Co., 29
Ky. L R. 1136, 97 S. W. 14 (190). As to cases in which the care required
to be used is prescribed by statute as a matter of law, see Oleson v. Lake
Shore, ctc., R. Co., 143 Ind. 405, 42 N. E. 736 (1895).
' Sullivan v. New York, etc.,.R. Co., 154 Mass. Sz, 28 N. F. 91 (i89r);
Clark v. Northern Pacific R. Co, 47 Minn. 380, So N. W 365 (1891); Malott
v. Hawkins, 159 Ind. 327, 63 N. E. 3o8 (i90w).
Greenwood v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 124 Pa. 572, 17 Ati. 188 (188);
Kenter v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2o4 Pa. 497, 54 Ati. 276 (z903) ; Razzis el ux.
v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 273 Pa. 55o (1922); Flick v. Northampton
& Bath R. Co., 274 Pa. 347 (-922) ; Mensch v. Director General of Railroads,
274 Pa. 356 (1922);

Kelly v. Director General of Railroads, 274 Pa. 470

(922) ; also for an unnecessary extension of the "stop, look, and listen" rule
see 70 U. OF PA. L. REv., z37 (z922).
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the tracks for a distance that would ordinarily insure a safe passage
across. The practical result of this requirement where the view of
the tracks is obstructed at a crossing is that a person must get out
of his vehicle and literally lead it across the tracks in order to avoid
being guilty of contributory negligence that will bar his recovery.
There are many circumstances that have not been treated in
this Note, but in practically all of them the rule requiring reasonable
care is applied. The rule is necessarily broad to cover the various
situations that may arise. In its application, the rule often appears
to be inadequate, leading to confusing results. The decisions in
many cases, with practically the same set of facts, vary materially.
This variance, however, is not necessarily due to the rule, but rather
to the lack of uniformity in the interpretative powers of the juries,
or the rules of the courts as to what reasonable care is. The question is such a vast one with such a variety of possible situations that
no restricted rule could justly meet all the circumstances that might
arise under it.

.G. L., Jr.

A RIPARIAN OR LITTORAL OWNER'S RIGHT or AccEss AS
AFFEcTED By ARTIFICIAL AcclrIos.-A very interesting question
involving the rights of a riparian or littoral owner upon navigable
waters to access and artificial accretions, as opposed to the rights of
the public or the rights of the owner of the foreshore, is presented
in the recent New York case of Tiffany v. The Town of Oyster
Bay.' The plaintiff, in that case,2 a riparian, or rather a littoral-2
owner of uplands abutting on the sea, filled in the adjacent foreshore-the land between the high and low-water marks-after title
to it had been granted to him by the State. It vas later judicially
determined, 3 however, that title to the foreshore was in the defendant town by a prior grant; whereupon the plaintiff offered to restore
the foreshore by removing the filled-in portion. But the town refused
the offer, and began erecting public bath-houses thereon. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the town from so doing. The court granted
the injunction, enjoining the defendant town from erecting structures upon the filled-in portion, or in any other way interfering with
the plaintiff's right of access to the water along the whole frontage
of his property. The court based its decision upori the theory that
although the plaintiff could not claim the "fill-in" since he had been
1234 N. Y. 15, 136 N. E 224 (i9=).
'The Court of Appeals here affirmed the decision of the Appellate Divi-

sion in z92 App. Div. 126 (2920), which had reversed that of the trial court

in Io.Misc. Rep. 445 (i9x8).
' A littoral owner is the owner of land bordering on the sea or ocean.
'2-9 N. Y. 1 (1913).
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technically a trespasser, and the town, as owner of the foreshore,
had title to it, nevertheless the town owned the filled-in portion, not
as upland, but in its previous character as "land under water." And
the plaintiff was held entitled to the same rights of access over it as
before, as if no filling-in had occurred.
The various rights of the adjacent owner, the public and the
owner of the foreshore in the foreshore itself seem not to be clearly
defined in most American jurisdictions. "The law on this subject is
rather indefinite. Judges have decided cases and indulged in safe
generalities, but have refrained from forming explicit rules unnecessary to the decision." - This has been true particularly in New York
where the instant case was decided.5 However, it is clear that the
foreshore is subject, (i) to the rights of the public for navigation,
fishing and bathing; (2) to the rights of the riparian owner to reasonable, safe and convenient access to the navigable part of the
water; and (3) to the rights of the owner of the foreshore, which
are subject to both the rights of the public and the riparian owner.$
Although there is a flat split of authority in America'n jurisdiction as to whether a riparian owner owns to high ' or low-water
mark,' nevertheless there seems to be no practical difference in the
effect of each view upon the ripariai owner's rights of access and
to accretions. In both he owns absolutely to high-water mark, and
below low-water mark title is in the state. The only differeice is
that in the latter view he has title also to the foreshore, extending to
low-water mark, subject, however, to the public rights of navigation,
fishing and bathing;.' and under the former, the title to the foreshore is in the state, which, holds in trust for the public, but with
an easement of access to the navigjable part of the water existing in
favor of the riparian owner.10
The right of access over the foreshore to the navigable part
of the water is a well recognized property right of riparian ownership." It cannot ltetaken away or impaired for private use, and
the riparian owner can, therefore, enjoin a trespasser from placing
Pound, J., in Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, supra in Note i, at p. 20.
'See George Sanford Parsons, "Public and Private Rights in the Fore-

shore," 22 COL. L REv. 7o6, 726 (Dec. senz).
'Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, supra in Note 1, Pp. 20 and 2r.
Barney.v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 24 1 ed. 224 (1876).
'Freeland v. Penna. R. R. Co.. 197 Pa. 529. 47 Atd. 745 (igoi); State v.
Korrer. 1--Minn. 6o, 148 N. W. 617 (1914).
*Electric Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 2To Pa. 517, 113 At. 559 (1921);

State v. Korrer, supra in Note 8.

"Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, i88 N. Y. 74, So N. F 665 (iqo7);
Allen v. Allen, 19 R. 1. 1 4. 32 At. 166 (1895) ; San Francisco v. Petroleum
Co., 144 Cal. 134, 77 Pac. 823 (1904).
SYates v-.Milwaukee. to Wall.
19
LI ed. 94 (U. S. 187o); Mansfield
v.
65 Ohio St. 4P, 63 N. E. S6
.alliett.
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structures upon the foreshore which will interfere with his right of
access.12 A riparian owner may, however, be deprived partially of
his right of access by eminent domain, for public purposes of navigation and commerce, but only upon due compensation; Is and a
safe and reasonable access must be provided for him to the water
front." But where the interference with the right results incidentally
from the exercise by the state of its police power, no compensation
need be made.'
It is obvious that in order to retain his right of access the
riparian owner must* necessarily continue to be a riparian owner,
and the law therefore gives him all the accretions resulting from a
shifting of his water boundary line." This has been held a vested
property right,'- and includes the right to all future accretions. If
through another's act he is deprived of them, it has been held that
he may recbver damages for those accretions which he would otherwise have had. 5 When conveying the adjacent land, the riparian
owner can, according to sound dicta, reserve all future accretions to
himself.'
All decisions are in accord on the proposition that the
riparian owner is entitled to all natural accretions-defined to be the
gradual and imperceptible increase of land caused by deposits of
earth, sand and sediment upon the shore of contiguous waters."0
But the decisions are not so clear when the accretions have been
caused directly or indirectly by artificial means or conditions created
by third parties or for which the riparian owner himself is iesponsible. Nevertheless, decisions that appear at first sight to be flatly
'San Francisco v. Petroleum Co., supra in Note
cific Coast Co., i6o Fed. 74. 87 C. C. A. s68 (i9o8).
422,

10;

McCloskey v. Pa-

"State v. Korrer, supra in Note 8; Home v. Commonwealth,
80 N. E. x24 (9o9).

202

Mass.

"Where a railroad, built over the foreshore under grant from the state,

cuts off the riparian owner's access, the riparian owner, although not entitled
to an injunction as in the case of a private individual, can nevertheless secure
compensation and the railroad must maintain safe crossings for the riparian
owner to the water front. Saunders v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. 144 N. Y.
75, 38 N. E. 9W2 (1894); Rumscy v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 133 N. Y. 79, 30
N. F. 657 (1892).
"Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 164, 45 L. ed. 126, 14 Sup. Ct. 48
(igoo); Sage v. The Mayor, z54 N. Y. 61, 47 N. E. io96 (i897).
"Nirlinger v. Stevens, --62 Fed. $91 (P. C. 1919).
"Thiesen v. Gulf, tr., Ry. Co., 75 Fla. A, 78 So. 491 (98).
"Where a railroad company lawfully built a bank out on the opposite
shore, thus causing the thread of the stream to change, which resulted in the
deflection of the theretofore usual deposits of sediment from the shores of
the adjacent owner elsewhere, the riparian owner recovered for the accretion
he would otherwise have had. Freeland v. Penna. R. R. Co., si'ra in Note 8.
"People Y. Jones, 112 N. Y. 597, 20 N. E. 577 0889); Frank v. Goddin,
193 Mo. .1o, 3951
9 S. W. 1057 (19o5).

"Jefferis

v. Land Co., i34 U. S. 178, 33 L ed. 872 (1889).
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opposed to each other can be reconciled, and the decisive factor
seems to be the ownership of the foreshore and land under water
beyond the low-water mark, as will be shown below.
Wher-e the accretions have been caused either partly or wholly
by conditions created by persons other than the riparian owner or
owner of the foreshore they belong to the riparian owner of the
adjacent upland.21 On the other hand, where the third party, who
was responsible for the accretions, had title to the foreshore, under
a grant from the state, the riparian owner did not get the accretion,
and the fill-in was held to retain its previous character as "land under
water," over which the riparian owner still had the same right of
access as before.2 2 But where the fill-in is caused by a government
contractor dredging the river, there are dicta to the effect that even
though neither the contractor nor the Federal Government had
title to the foreshore, yet, since he is an agent of the government,
the accretions do not accrue to the riparian owner, but remain "land
under water," title to which is in the state or another as owner of
the foreshore.23 The riparian owner has been held not to be required to take any positive steps to prevent one not the owner of
the foreshore from building a structure thereon, and he will not be
deprived of the accretion that subsequently results from his failure
to do so.24 In general, therefore, it seems that where accretions
result from conditions created by third persons, they will accrue to
the riparian owner unless the third person himself owns the foreshore, as grantee of the state, in which case no one gets the accretion as "upland."
Similarly, where the riparian ownerhimself fills in the foreshore or is responsible for the artificial conditions from which the
accretion results, it has been held that he obtains title to the accretion providing he had first acquired title to the foreshore by a grant
from the state, or has by statute been permitted to fill in and reclaim
" Where accretion resulted from a wharf being wrongfully built by a city
government in front of A's upland, where title to the foreshore was still in
the state, it was held to belong to A. Steers v. City of Brooklyn, YoT N. Y.
450 (1917). The same was
5T, 4 N. E. 7 (1885): Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill.
held where a railroad had merely a right of way over the foreshore, but no
title thereto. Rumsey v. N. Y. & N. E.L R, supra in Note x4.
' Saunders v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., supra in Note x4.
'Black v. American International Corp, 264 Pa. 260, xo7 Atl. 737 (1919);
Nevins v. Friedlander, iOo X' Y. S. 682, r98 App. Div. 25o (sps).
Where the riparian owner claiming the accretion resulting from a
municipal pier that had been erected in front of his land, was a member of
city councils when the project was approved, but did not vote on the question,
the court said that he wa- not required to have opposed the project to be
entitled to the accretion resulfit0,erefrom. Brundage v. Knox, supra in
Note 21.
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it.'25 But, on the other hand, where the title to the foreshore is
still in the state or in a third person, the riparian owner has been
held to be a trespasser and does not acquire the accretion due to a
filling-in or resulting from unlawful artificial conditions created by
himself; but the fill-in is considered as "land under water," over
which the riparian owner retains right of access.2 ' It appears,
therefore, that where the riparian owner is himself responsible for
the accretion he will acquire title thereto only when he owns the
foreshore; whereas in the third person cases he fails to get the
accretion only when the third person owns the foreshore.
The case of Tiffany v. The Town of Oyster Bay - presents an

interesting combination of both of these types of cases. Had the
riparian owner owned the foreshore, as he believed he did, when he
filled it in, he would undoubtedly have acquired the fill-in. On the
other hand, had the town made the fill-in, having title to the foreshore, no one would have gotten the accretion, which remained in
contemplation of law "land urder water." But under the combination of facts in this case, the riparian owner under a reasonable mistake of fact was technically a trespasser on the foreshore when he
filled it in, and therefore could acquire no title to the accretion. If,
however, the title to the ne' ly formed land was to be awarded to
the owner of the foreshore in its actual character as "upland," he
would get indirectly what he could not get directly, and this strip
would intercede between the riparian, owner and the waterfront,
thus cutting off his valuable right of access, which would work a
grave injustice to him. It seems, therefore, that the fiction of the
court in which they regard the newly-created upland as "land under
water," over which the riparian owner still retains his right of
access and the owner of the foreshore his title, °is the most logical
and equitable decision under the circumstances.
S. H. S.

CIVIL

RIGHTS OF A CIURCHu MEMER WHO HAS

PRIVED OF MEMRE

BEEN

DE-

sHIiP.-In America, there is no established church,

the church and state being separated by both the Federal and the
state constitutions.1 Judgments rendered by church tribunals, therefore, are not part of the public law, and need not be so considered
"Baltimore v. St. Agnes Hospital, 48 Md. 419 (1877); Simpson v. Moore-

head, 65 N. J. L 623, 65 AtI. 887 (i9o3).
'Saunders v. N. Y. Central and Hudson R. R., supra in Note T4; Dana
v. Jackson Wharf Co., 31 Cal. 118 (I866) ; Revell v. People, 177 11. 468, $ N.
F- 1052 (1899).

' Supra in Note I.
, United States Constitution, First Amendment
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by the civil courts. However, it may become necessary for civil
courts to consider these decisions and pass on their validity. This
necessity arises when a decision of a church tribunal, which concerns or affects the rights to church property, is claimed to be
wrongful in itself, or to have been given in a situation where the
tribunal had wrongfully entertained jurisdiction. The civil courts
will consider these claims in a variety of cases. For example, when
the disputed ecclesiastical decision has decided which party in a
controversy has complied with the terms of an instrument establishing a specific church trust;3 or when two factions in a church both
claim to be the properly constituted church tribunal; 4 or where a
clergyman claims that a church tribunal has wrongfully impaired his
contractual relations. 5 Such a claim may possibly be considered
where the complainant, a church member, contends that a church
tribunal has unjustly deprived him of his membership. The scope of
this Note is limited to the last mentioned class of cases in which it
is alleged that a loss has been suffered, for which the civil courts
are aked to provide a remedy. Two questions then present themselves. First, does church membership involve any property rights
cognizable by a temporal court? Second, under what circumstances
will the courts, if they have jurisdiction, question the validity of
the decisions of church tribunals which caused this loss?
The answer to the first of these questions is obscure. Membership in a church organization is apparently a necessary qualification,
in order that a person may have any title to or beneficial interest in
church property. In a recent Pennsylvania case, 6 the petitioners
admitted that they had lost their membership, but claimed that they
still had rights in the church property. This contention was not
recognized by the Court, which held that, having lost their membership, they ipso facto lost all rights to church property. From this
it would appear that church membership and rights in church property are indivisible. If this is so, then the rights in church property
must be an integral part of that church membership from which
these rights flow. Several courts, in their decisions, seem to indicate
'The church tribunals of the established church in England are in relatively the same position as inferior civi! courts in America. They are recognized as courts by the state, and decisions within proper jurisdiction are final
unless reversed on proper appeal. Atty. General v. Pearson, 3 Meri. 353
(Eng. 1817). A similar situation existed in New England, where there was
an established church for some time after the Revolution. Dillingham v.
Snow et al., 5 Mass. 547 (imop). Alna v. Plummer, 3 Me. 88 (x824).
'Wallace v. Hughes, I3 Ky. 445, "15 S. IV. 68. (i9o9).
' West Koshkoning Cong. v. Otteson. Fo Wis. 62, 49 N. W. 24 (1891).
'Jennings v. Scarborough, _6 N1. J. L 401, 28 Atd. 559 (58'4).
'St. Casimir's Polish R. C. Church Case, 27,3 Pa. 494 (7922).
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this. By giving relief to a member who has been unjustly expelled
from a church organization, these courts point out that the loss of
membership in a church includes the loss of rights in the church
property; such rights are temporal in their nature and not ecclesiastical; and that, for the loss of temporal rights, civil courts may grant
relief. However, many courts-perhaps the majority-treat the
question of church membership as entirely ecclesiastical, involving no
rights which a civil court may recognize 8 The loss of membership,
it has been said, is a loss without the violation of any right owing
to the member, such a loss as can properly be termed damnum absque
iznuria.9 There is apparently no possibility of reconciling these conflicting views. One affirms what the other denies. However, in the
aforementioned Pennsylvania case,10 the opinion stated that church
membership and rights in church property are indivisie, and then
a few lines below the question of church membership was said to
be entirely ecclesiasticil, involving no rights which the civil courts
could recognize. Of course, as pointed out before, this case only
decides that persons not members can have no rights in church
property. But from statements in the opinion the logical deduction
is that civil courts can give no relief when church property is wrongfully taken from members of a church. Property rights being, as
this opinion states, a part of membership, and membership being a
purely ecclesiastical matter, the wrongfully disbarred member of a
religious organization must look in vain to the civil courts for a
remedy. Fortunately, a church member is very seldom deprived of
his membership without just and sufficient cause, and cases where
dismissals are wrongful have been few in number.
Under what circumstances will the civil courts question the
validity of the decision of a church tribunal, which deprives a person of his church membership? The answer to this second question
is more clearly given in the decided cases. If the loss of -membership
is not considered as including a temporal as well as an ecclesiastical
loss, then clearly this question does not arise. But where the court
considers the loss of membership a sufficient property loss to allow
a civil court to entertain jurisdiction, then this second question becomes of great importance.
'Gray v. Christian Society, 137 Mass. 329 (i884); Canadian Religious
Assn. v. Parmenter, 18o Mass. 415, 62 N. E. 74o (go92) ; Hendryx v. People's
United Church, 42 Wash. 396, 84 Pac. 123 (1906); Holcombe v. Leavitt, 69
Misc. 232, 124 N. Y. S. 980 (19io).
'Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253 (Ky. 1842); Walker v. Howell, 20
Misc. 236, 45 N. Y. S. ;"9o 0897); Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, 111
N. E. 358 (919i) ; Kauffman v. Plank, 214 II. App.'290 (1919); Fairchild v.
Tillotson, x18 Misc. 639, 195 N. Y. S. 39 (1922).
'Kauffman v. Plank, supra in Note 8.
' Supra in Note 6.
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It is accepted as the general rule that the civil courts will not'
take jurisdiction to review the action of a church judicatory in expelling any of its members for reasons involving church discipline or
matters of creed. The church may be said to be a law unto itself
for its procedure in religious mattersi' The reason given for such
a rule is that every person who joins a church organization submits
himself to the jurisdiction of that body, and, in matters of faith
and discipline he subjects himself to the tribunal established by the
ecclesiastical body to pass upon such questions." He might be said
to have voluntarily assumed the risk of expulsion for any cause involving faith, doctrine or discipline. Such questions belong exclusively to the church and its spiritual officers, since the civil courts
cannot be expected to become learned in the vast volume of ecclesiastical law and precedent which is the inherited legacy of most
church tribunals 3a In any such expulsion, the member may be said
to have destroyed his membership by his own acts. Such an expulsion is not, therefore, considered an invasion of a property right,
and in the absence of a property loss, the expelled member has no
basis for a claim in a civil court. But when the expulsion or severance of relationship is based on other reasons, which are claimed to
be arbitrary and unfair, then the civil courts may entertain juris.
diction and decide whether the petitioning member was thereby
de14
prived arbitrarily of that which he rightfully should possess.
In an early Massachusetts case,25 a church member was dropped
from the roll because of his non-attendance. This was done accordhe arbitrary and unfair, then the civil courts may entertain juristion and decreed that the inhnred member he reinstated. In that
case there was no question of discipline or creed, and the civil court,
in taking jurisdiction, seemed to affirm the position that civil
courts may review, and, if necessary, reverse the decisions of church
tribunals, when they have decided issues which do not involve matters of discipline or questions of religious belief. In a more recent
Washington case," the rules of the church organization -provided
that the governing body reserved the right to expel a member summarily. The expelled member was granted relief by a civil court,
because the reason for expulsion did not involve any question of
"Shannon v. Frost, supra in Note 8.
"Landis v. Campbell, 79 44o. 433, 439 (883)

; Permanent Committee, etc.,

v. Pacific Synod. etc., 157 Cal. zo5, io6 Pac. 393 (igo).
"IVatson v. Jones, So U. S. (3 Wall.) 679. ao L. ed. 666'(1872).

This

is the leading case on the subject of the right of a civil court to review ecclesiastical decisions.

"Jones v. State. 28 Neb. 4!r, 44 N. NV. 6!8 (189o); Fullrisht v. I'.gginbotlam, z33 Mo. 668. 34 S. W. 875 (,o6); Canadian Religious Assn. v. Parneenter. supra in Note 7; Holcombe v. Leavitt, supra in Note 7.
Gray v. Christian Society, supra in Note 7.
"Hendryx v. People's United Church,. sfipra in 'Note 7.

ERRATA.
Page 153, line 12. "representatives" should be representations.
The second paragraph, page i64. "In an early Massachusetts case, "' a church member was dropped from the roll
because of his non-attendance. This was done according
to a by-law of the organization. The civil court took jurisdiction and decreed that the injured member be reinstated.
in that case, etc.
."
Page 174. Interchange first and second lines at top of
page.
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discipline or religious belief. In each of those cases, the expelled
member had consented, at the time when he joined the organization,
to abide by such action. In the Pennsylvania case mentioned above,T
the members had likewise agreed to abide by the decrees of the
power which had removed them from membership. Why this agreement did not prevent action by the civil court in all of these cases is
difficult to understand. Such an agreement has been held sufficient
to prevent a civil court from granting relief to a dismissed college
student.1 8 However, the courts have, for the most part, overlooked
the contractual feature of church membership. They have taken the
above distinction between things temporal and things spiritual which
they found in a United States Supreme Court decision," and have
applied it to the facts before them. Since this distinction rests
largely on individual opinion,, the decisions are confused and can
never be wholly reconciled.
The view that membership in a church includes a property right
would seem to be sound. The temporal property of a church is
usually an accumulation in one form or another of the contributions
of its members. The property must, of necessity, belong -to some
one, and those who contributed the property and who are entitled
to its use and enjoyment would seem logically to be the proper
owners. In Pennsylvania, by statute, 0 the beneficial title and the
control of church property vests in the congregation. Furthermore,
if church membership is considered a property right, it should be
treated in the same manner as any other property right. The courts
should consider that it is based on the initial agreement, by which
the petitioner became a member.21 Any decisions by church tribunals which-are within the terms of this agreement should be respected and affirmed-. Any decisions which are breaches of the
agreement should be declared void and of no effect, regardless of the
subject matter. This vould do away with the distinction between
things temporal and things spiritual which must always be vague
and uncertain. To adopt this theory would clear away the present
uncertainty, and consequently lessen the unfortunately large volume
of church litigation in civil courts.

s.P.C.

" St. Casimir's Polish R.C. Church Case, mipra in Note 6.
x Dist. & Co. Reps. 383
"Barker v. Bryn Mawr College Trustees ctal.,
(Pa. 1922). Reviewed and discussed in 70 U. or PA. L RM.303, 306 (x'z).
"Watson v. Jones, supra in Note z3.
" Act of April 26, z855, P. L. 330. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has sc construed this statute. Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 233 Pa. 138, 8r AtL
938 (191i).

'Zollman. American Civil Church Law (Columbia University Studie.
Vol. 77, 1917). This work reviews the subject of the validity and force of
church decisions, and suggests this theory as a solution of the problem. p.
234.

